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Abstract—Location-Based Services (LBS) are becoming more
prevalent. While there are many benefits, there are also real
privacy risks. People are unwilling to give up the benefits - but
can we reduce privacy risks without giving up on LBS entirely?
This paper explores the possibility of introducing uncertainty into
location information when using an LBS, so as to reduce privacy
risk while maintaining good quality of service. This paper also
explores the current uses of uncertainty information in a selection
of mobile applications.
The prevalence of Location-Based Services (LBS) in mod-
ern technology has created new risks to user privacy. Since
users are unwilling to surrender many of the benefits of LBS,
new methods are needed to reduce such risks. This paper
explores the possibility of introducing artificial uncertainty into
location information when using an LBS without rendering it
useless. Uncertainty occurs naturally, so LBS are likely to work
in spite of uncertainty. For example, Figure 1 shows location
determined by an Apple iPad at Schloss Dagstuhl. Initially,
the location was reported with a high degree of uncertainty.
Later, the uncertainty was reduced – but the location was not
exactly as reported. Our question is: Can we protect privacy
by providing uncertain location data, while still retaining good
service?
To motivate this problem, let us first recall some instances
where these privacy concerns arose. One such case, which
received considerable popular attention, is Apple storing and
collecting location data from its users’ iPhones, unbeknownst
to the user. The issue was uncovered on April 20th, 2011.
Researchers discovered a file, consolidated.db, that contained
longitudes and latitudes combined with a timestamp. This file
contained locations that dated as far back as the release of iOS
4, which made it contain a year’s worth of location data, stored
on the iPhone, synced (backed up) with iTunes and transmitted
to Apple, all without the user’s knowledge [1].
The “Please Rob Me” website is another prime example of
the risks of location privacy ( http://pleaserobme.com/ ). The
website seeks to raise awareness of the risks posed to location
privacy, specifically it provides an interactive map of the places
a user checks-in to point out when the user is not at home.
The check-in history allows the system to determine the most
likely location for the user’s home. While our discussion will
not include a solution to this issue, the website highlights the
prevalence and practical risk posed by lack of location privacy.
Another particularly poignant example is the application
“Girls Around Me”, which combines social media info and
location to find nearby women (who hadn’t necessarily said
Fig. 1. Location uncertainty at Schloss Dagstuhl (actual location in hallway outside room N009)
they want to be found) [2]. Additionally, with one click the
user can access the Facebook profiles of any of the pictured
girls.
There are numerous other programs that collect location
data from mobile devices. For the purposes of our discussion,
we will only concern ourselves with those applications which
collect data and use the information to provide an agreed-
upon service. It should be noted that there are also applications
which use location information, but not to provide any end-
user service, however these apps will not be considered in our
discussion. These two ideas are not mutually exclusive, for
instance a mapping application that records a timestamp may
need longitude and latitude but not the time when you were at
that location. It should also be noted that there exist methods
for preventing the collection of location data entirely, however
these methods completely nullify the benefits of applications
which provide location services. Our primary focus, then,
concerns discussing methods that hinder the undesired tracking
capacities of applications, while still ensuring the same quality
from desired services.
The outline of the paper is as follows: In Section I we
establish what is meant by privacy for the purposes of this dis-
cussion. In Section I-A we discuss the legal status of collecting
and using location data by applications. Section II discusses
the privacy considerations we will be concerned with here,
and potential methods for introducing uncertainty into location
data. For the purposes of this discussion, by “uncertainty” we
will mean any method which seeks to intentionally decrease
the confidence of a third party to determine a user’s specific
location. Section III discusses the current impact of uncertain
location data on quality of service for applications where
location is inherently relevant to the requested service.
I. PRIVACY ANALYSIS
One key challenge that must be addressed is how to analyze
privacy. While there has been some research in this area (e.g.,
[3], [4]), this is still a challenge with room for research,
especially with regard to real world applications.
We are considering the following agents: an application
provider offering one or more dedicated services to a certain
class of clients, which might be formed by subscription or even
on an ad-hoc basis. Each of the clients might repeatedly request
one of the services. Each request comes along with data about
the requester’s location in order to enable the provider to return
a location-dependent reaction to the requester. Without privacy-
preserving measurements, the location would be determined in
the best possible way, uncertainty is solely a result of technical
limitations in determining the precise position. In addition,
each request is associated with a time stamp, which reflects
real time by default. Introducing additional mechanisms for
privacy-preservation enables a client to purposely generate
further uncertainty about his or her actual location. Though
the time data might be blurred as well, for the sake of
simplicity we leave this option open to future considerations.
Accordingly, over time the provider receives a sequence of
requests, each consisting of at least the following components:
location, time, kind of request.
Beyond supposedly providing the service requested hon-
estly, the provider may behave in a curious way, analyzing the
collection of request data received so far for the sake of any
secondary use. We discuss four types of secondary analysis that
are particularly relevant to location data; while not a complete
list, these do give an idea of the kinds of things a service
provider may do with location data and the potential impact
to users. Moreover, we emphasize the following need of a
client: in order to decide about the employment of uncertainty
generating mechanisms, a requesting client has to evaluate the
potentials for a successful analysis by the provider according
to some metrics.
Location-based reidentifiability: In the case where re-
quests come without the requester’s identification, the provider
might aim to associate an identifier to each of the requests.
This could be the exact identifier of the actual requester;
alternatively and less ambitiously, some assertion about the
relationship between the request and the clients. As far as the
provider succeeds in establishing a nontrivial and meaningful
association, he would either learn precise personal data or
obtain data that is somehow potentially personal and, thus,
he would be able to compromise privacy to some extent.
Seen from the point of view of a client acting as requester,
that client would be interested to estimate the extent of
compromise achievable by the provider according to some
suitable metric.
Location identification and classification: Whether by
technical failures or by intentional blurring, a communicated
location might differ from the actual one. Accordingly, the
provider might aim to determine the actual location by some
kind of reasoning, thereby strengthening his knowledge about
the requester. As far as the requester is already identified, in
this way the provider would obtain improved personal data
regarding the requester. If the requester is so far not fully
identified, more precise knowledge about the actual location
might be helpful for the reidentification analysis or other
analysis tasks.
Besides pure geographical data about the location, the
provider might also aim to determine the kind of social activi-
ties offered at the respective place and thus learn information of
the requester’s activities, again potentially leading to even more
crucial personal data, for instance if the provider can determine
that the requests are coming from a cancer treatment center.
Typically, social activities could be classified and denomi-
nated according to some ontology, e.g., distinguishing between
shopping, medical care, entertainment, food services, sports,
education, and so on, even possibly refined to subcategories
and enhanced by further descriptive features.
Again, the client would like to evaluate the expected
achievements, in particular in terms of the grade of success
and the sensitivity of an identified location depending on its
semantics, according to some metric.
Subtrajectory linkage: While strictly speaking a client
only communicates location-time points, she or he actually
provides information about her or his movements over the
time, i.e., about the resulting trajectory. Accordingly, the
provider might aim to reconstruct the actual trajectory in an
approximative way in order to learn more about the client.
As before, besides the pure geographical data about the full
trajectory, he might additionally be interested in the semantics
of the curve in terms of a suitable ontology that extends the
ontology for single locations.
Reconstructing an actual trajectory necessarily includes
linking single locations as communicated and subtrajectories
obtained before as belonging to the same client. This need
is clearly supported by already knowing the association of
the requests with identifiers, but also conversely, if originally
unknown, learning this association might be facilitated by
having established links before.
Again, the client would like to evaluate the expected
achievements, in particular in terms of the grade of success
and the sensitivity of a reconstructed trajectory depending on
its semantics.
Habitual Classification: Even if a set of requests is
insufficient to link a meaningful subtrajectory or to clearly
identify the user or the location, a provider might wish to
classify the user according to certain metrics, e.g., for context-
based advertising or to forecast the user behavior.
For example, it is possible to guess the social environment
of a user by observing which ID’s regularly issue requests from
similar positions. A provider might find out the employment
status by comparing the requests from workdays with the
requests issued at weekends. It is also possible to learn about
vacations, religion, etc.
The challenge remains to define and compile a complete
list of the risks to privacy that Location-Based Services pose.
Such a compilation will aid creation and analysis of privacy
enhancing techniques designed to combat these risks by allow-
ing better descriptions of the effect of these techniques.
A. Legal status of location privacy
The goal of introducing uncertainty in location when using
LBS to help minimize violations of privacy can have legal
implications as well, as location information can fall under the
purview of privacy laws particularly dealing with identification
or re-identification of data. An element in the definition of
personal data in the EC Directive is that personal data indicates
an identified or identifiable person. In other words, the terms
“identified or identifiable” focus on the conditions under which
an individual should be considered as “identifiable”. In this
regard the particular conditions of a specific case play an
important role in this determination. Therefore the effect of
uncertainty has to be addressed individually.
Location-based services in general process personal data
in order to fulfill their contractual duties. The legal ground of
using such information primarily is bound to the requirements
of “informed consent” or “performance of a contractual duty
under EC Directive 95/46 ([5], OJ L 281, p. 31 of 23.11.1995).
Furthermore, processing on a secondary basis requires the
fulfillment of at least one of the exceptions under the EC
Directive such as the existence of a “legitimate interest” of
the data processor or the existence of a “vital interest” of the
data subject.
II. METHODS TO INDUCE UNCERTAINTY
It is reasonably straightforward for a mobile device to
report something other than true location information. In
fact, the Android operating system has a “debugging” feature
allowing users to specify the exact longitude and latitude of the
position returned to the application, although this feature does
not extend to supplying the accuracy of this fake location. Ap-
plications exist on the Google Playstore to provide a friendly
user interface for this feature [6], [7]. Software exists for the
Android OS, when rooted, to expand on this capability and
report user-specified information to applications rather than
any actual information. This software extends to all forms
of information, including the reported accuracy of a location.
Thus the question is not can we report an uncertain location,
but how do we determine the uncertain location to report?
Work in this area attempts to decrease the certainty by
which a location service can establish connections between
specific users and their location data. In particular, we strive
to degrade the confidence of these associations to the point
that we can provide a well-defined level of protection against
an adversary attempting to either (1) identify an individual
from a particular location or a sequence of locations, (2)
link a location or a sequence of locations to an individual,
(3) connect a set of locations to a trajectory that belongs to
the same (yet anonymous) individual, or (4) gain information
about an individual based on habitual requests or locations.
For that purpose, a wide number of anonymization approaches
and obfuscation techniques exist. We subsume these techniques
under the term “uncertainty methods”. The applicability of
uncertainty methods depends on the kind of data that needs
to be modified. Thus, we distinguish between the introduction
of uncertainty to single locations and sequences of locations.
While single locations are typical for one-shot queries sent
to a location-based system, sequences of locations might be
trajectories recorded by a smartphone with an activated GPS
receiver or sequences of consecutive queries that have been
sent from multiple positions to a location-based service.
The amount of uncertainty that is bound to a certain
location or a trajectory depends on many factors. For example,
if a pedestrian produces a location in the middle of a motorway
or in a military exclusion area, an adversary might guess that
this is implausible. Another example is a cyclist who has
generated sequences of locations in distances that cannot be
reached with the typical speed of a bicycle.
The actual effect of uncertainty may also be hindered by
the apriori knowledge of the attacker rather than inherent
attributes of the location itself. Beyond simple descriptions
of location as a region of equal probability, an attacker likely
possesses a number of maps of the uncertain location. Each
of these maps imparts a form of semantics on the region that
can suggest plausible positions within the uncertain location,
thus reducing the true uncertainty achieved. An attacker is
also able to potentially gain information about a group as a
whole by viewing a collection of reported anonymous groups
as the attacker gains knowledge of a large group of people in
a relatively stable reporting area. The attacker is still unable
to provide unique details about the target but are able to
gain some insight about the group as a whole, the targeted
individual included. This type of inference can still be a
privacy violation even if the attacker is unable to define
unique attributes. Assuming attackers have access to a history
of location information, the attacker might be able to gain
knowledge of similarity to previously identified points even if
the new point is given with uncertainty. All of these factors
can lead to information being revealed and privacy violated
even if each single point is given with artificial uncertainty.
To ease our presentation, in the following we consider pairs
of latitude, longitude only. However, all approaches described
can be easily applied to more complex spatio-temporal settings
by considering height and time as additional dimensions that
are treated in the same way as latitude, longitude.
We do not presume to give a complete survey of work
in the area of location privacy, or a comprehensive listing
of possible techniques, but rather a few choice examples to
highlight the issues and possibilities.
A. Obfuscation techniques
Obfuscation techniques work to decrease the specificity of
the location information provided to the service on behalf of a
particular individual. In general, these methods can be applied
by each user in isolation. One of the most intuitive techniques
to increase the uncertainty of a location information is to add or
multiply the latitude, longitude-record with a random number
taken from a uniform distribution. The upper and lower bounds
of the probability distribution function are a measure for the
amount of uncertainty obtained.
A more sophisticated approach [8] takes the amount of
uncertainty into account that has been already induced by the
location sensor. In particular, the approach assumes that the
correct position of a user is uniformly distributed over a circle
that has been reported as center, radius by a GPS device. The
radius specifies the uncertainty of the location information.
This technique considers increases in privacy that can be
gained by shifting the returned location or by modifying the
radius of uncertainty rather than simply considering expansions
of the radius.
Another method of obfuscation is the creation of a set
of realistic dummies [9]. With this approach, the user not
only sends a single position information to a location-based
service, but a number of artificial dummy positions plus
the real position. Accordingly, the service returns one result
for each query. The client filters the set of results for the
answer that corresponds to the real position. In this case,
uncertainty is not defined as uncertainty towards a region
(specified by a probability distribution), but as uncertainty
towards which of the queried positions is the real one. Later
work has focused on expanding the behavior of the generated
dummies to better simulate the actual travel behavior of users
to prevent the discovery of dummies. Behavior expansions
include accounting for road networks over simple euclidean
distance and travel constraints based on map information [10]
and including pauses in the travel patterns of dummies [4].
As these techniques require that an adversary is unable to
distinguish which queries are generated by dummies, such
expansions of behavior add practical value to the privacy of
these techniques.
Finally, there exist approaches to replace latitude,
longitude-pairs with the positions of prominent landmarks [11].
For example, the exact position 49.530, 6.899 of a participant
of a seminar in Dagstuhl could be reported as “Saarland”,
“Germany” or “Europe”. The applicability of this kind of
obfuscation depends on the format in which a location-based
service requires location information.
B. Anonymization techniques
Anonymization techniques seek to obscure the relation
between a user’s identity and his location information, by
hiding his results amongst a set of other users.
Thus, anonymization requires the position information of
multiple users. A popular approach is Spatio-Temporal Cloak-
ing [12]. The approach adapts the concept of k-anonymity
for geographic coordinates. For this purpose, the approach
computes cliques of users that are close together, and releases
minimum bounding rectangles that contain the positions of at
least k different users each. Various variants of this concept
exist, e.g. peer-to-peer-anonymization [12]. These techniques
can also be used for entire trajectories [13].
Mix zones [14] are an approach to add uncertainty to spa-
tiotemporal settings where the users are continuously observed
by a service provider. The approach identifies each user by a
pseudonym. Furthermore, it divides regions into mix zones and
application zones. In predefined time intervals, all individuals
within a mix zone have the option to choose a new pseudonym.
Given the number of users in a mix zone is large enough, the
service provider cannot link the movement of an individual in
one application zone to the movement of the same individual
in another application zone.
The challenge is then to create a comprehensive set of
obfuscation and anonymization techniques designed to limit
the risk to privacy that can occur from secondary analysis of
location data as highlighted in Section I.
III. CURRENT USE OF LOCATION UNCERTAINTY
The degradation in quality of service from intentionally
giving uncertain locations is a critical issue and this is largely
dependent on the particular application, and the implementa-
tion of that service provider. To evaluate the use of uncertainty,
we first decompiled 19 applications on the Google Playstore
and attempted to trace whether the reported uncertainty was
used by the application and if so, how.
On a technical note, in the Android architecture there
are two system calls, one that returns the location and a
separate system call that returns the uncertainty of that location
expressed in meters. Prior to this discussion there has been
little impetus for the application developers to take into account
any information aside from the reported location. Therefore,
very few applications currently even make use of the extra
information provided. This consideration will not concern us
here, as these applications can simply be rewritten with the
other system call in mind if needed. Our principle claim is
that LBS can function in interesting ways in light of intentional
uncertainty.
The applications that we considered generally fall into two
categories: local search and check-in. Local search is a form
of LBS application that does not greatly depend on accurate
location so long as the uncertain data does not stray from
the current location drastically. These types of applications do
not generally ask for or make of use of reported uncertainty.
For instance, if a user’s location is reported within a five-mile
radius, the utility of Gas Buddy would not be greatly impaired.
It would still display a list of gas stations that were all within
fifteen miles of the user (the default for the application is ten
miles, but can be lessened) regardless of the inaccurate data.
Similarly, the local search functionality of the Yelp application
would also not be greatly disrupted. More generally, it seems
that most local search applications would not be rendered
dysfunctional by intentional uncertainty.
A priori more likely to break are check-in applications,
which use specific location information to ensure authenticity
TABLE I. ANDROID APPLICATIONS EVALUATED TO DETERMINE IF
THEY MAKE A SYSTEM CALL TO DETERMINE UNCERTAINTY, AND IF THEY
APPEAR TO SEND THAT INFORMATION TO THE SERVER.
Application Syscall Sends Impacts Outcome Local Search Check-In
AroundMe X
Blendr X
FourSquare X X X X
GasBuddy X X X
Google+ X
iExit X
Instagram X
iRadar X
Layar
Localicious X X
Lookout X
Neer X
Poynt X
Radardroid X
SCVNGR
Sygic
TaxiMagic X X
Yelp ( check-in ) X X X X
Yelp ( local search ) X X X
Zagat X
of the check-in. Indeed Foursquare, the most popular check-
in application, in an effort to prevent “armchair mayors”,
uses exact location information when possible, and applies
a different set of criteria when the reported uncertainty is
high [15], [16]. Therefore the functionality of this application
would be greatly impaired by introducing artificial uncertainty.
The Yelp application also has a check-in feature that uses a
different standard for determining authenticity. The application
computes the distance between your reported location and
the check-in site, and compares it to the reported uncertainty
[17]. Therefore, the Yelp application would continue to work
exactly as before even with the new inputs. This would allow
for check-ins while still maintaining privacy of the user.
Indeed, it even allows for a new measure of privacy in that
a user can timeshift their check-in by doing so before or after
their visit, where the length of time is proportional to the
intentional uncertainty introduced. Of course, this does pose a
new problem in verifying the authenticity of such check-in, but
nonetheless adds credence to the claim that LBS can function
without exact location information.
Finally, it may be objected that some LBS, for instance
turn-by-turn navigation and mapping applications, crucially
rely on precise location information for their very utility,
and that intentional uncertainty will render such services
completely useless. While we hope to investigate solutions to
this problem, we maintain that even if this is true, it does not
impugn the validity or importance of the questions raised here.
If we are successful in limiting the data released to other types
of LBS, this still represents a significant gain from a privacy
standpoint. The discussion will bear out exactly which LBS
essentially require exact location data, and how to provide the
others with uncertain data to protect the user’s privacy.
The challenge lies in the real-world application of privacy
enhancing techniques in current and future LBS applications
while maintaining the quality of service that users expect from
these Location-Based Services.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We have seen that location data can be misused in poten-
tially damaging ways: Location privacy is important. However,
location-based services are growing in popularity, and can
provide significant value. The fact that location is inherently
uncertain provides us an opportunity to maintain privacy while
getting the benefit of location-based services. This opens
opportunities for future research.
A first challenge is developing privacy definitions that pro-
vide practical protection. Different approaches may be needed
depending on the privacy threat. For example, providing a
distance-based region of uncertainty will protect against being
found by a stalker; whereas a variable-distance uncertainty
encompassing a k-anonymity style group may protect against
a “Girls Around Me” style of application (assuming the
adversary would not recognize which person you are within a
group.) Given appropriate privacy definitions, we may find new
challenges in implementing them, such as a mobile device in-
dependently (or perhaps in a peer-to-peer fashion) determining
the uncertainty needed to encompass a k-anonymous group.
There is also the challenge of ensuring that applications
make appropriate use of uncertainty data, ensuring good ser-
vice despite privacy controls. Thankfully, applications do seem
to recognize this data is available, and the fact that location
may already be uncertain means that applications that use
uncertainty information effectively are likely to win in the
marketplace.
In summary, we believe that autonomous provision of
privacy is both feasible, and can be done with limited impact
on use of location-based services. This is an area where
developments in privacy technology can have rapid transfer
to real-world use, and provide meaningful privacy.
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